In multi-cloud storage, the data owners host their data and access the data from cloud servers. However, this new paradigm of data hosting service also introduces new security challenges such as integrity, availability and confidentiality of data. The prior works on ensuring remote data integrity in multi-cloud storage often lacks the address of confidentiality and availability issues, which are always important aspects of quality of service (QoS). In this paper, we propose an effective and secure data storage protocol in multiple cloud. In our design, we encrypt and encode the data before outsourcing into clouds to ensure confidentiality and availability of data respectively. Then, we consider the third party auditor (TPA) to verify the integrity of the data stored in the multi-cloud and extend verification method to support batch verification for multiple owners. Extensive security, performance analysis and experimental results show that our scheme is efficient and secure in multi-cloud.
Introduction
Cloud storage is an important service of cloud computing, which allows the data owners to move their data from local computing systems to the cloud. More and more owners start to store their data in the cloud. This Cloud storage service offers or, rather, promises numerous benefits such as reduced capital and operational expenditure and shorter turnaround times for new services and applications. This is particularly attractive for users whose resource utilisation might vary dramatically, or whose hardware and maintenance costs form a main part of their overall budget. However, this storage paradigm of data also introduces new security issues (Mather et al., 2009) . The protection of these issues in cloud computing is a very challenging and potentially formidable task. The data owners would worry that the data might be lost in the cloud.
One idea on reducing the risk for data in the cloud is the simultaneous usage of multiple clouds (Bohli et al., 2013) . Since cloud computing environment is constructed based on open architectures and interfaces, it has the adaptability to incorporate multiple internal and/or external cloud services together to provide high interoperability. We call such distributed cloud environment as multi cloud (hybrid cloud). The multi cloud allows the data owners to easily access their data remotely through interfaces such as web services provided by Amazon EC2. However, even if such multiple cloud platforms were vulnerable to security attacks, it would bring irretrievable challenges to the owners such as integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data. For example, the confidential data in an enterprise may be illegally accessed through a remote interface provided by a multi-cloud, or relevant data may be lost or corrupted with when they are stored into an uncertain storage pool outside the enterprise (Bohli et al., 2013) . Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) down failure for several hours (Gohring, 2008 ) is one such example for these issues. Therefore, to ensure the full protection of data storage and save the cloud owners computational resources, it is indispensable for cloud service providers (CSPs) to provide security mechanisms for managing owner's storage data in multi-cloud storage environments.
Recently, several schemes (Ateniese et al., 2007 (Ateniese et al., , 2008 Juels and Kaliski, 2007; Shacham and Waters, 2008; Erway et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2011 Wang et al., , 2013 Barsoum and Hasan, 2013; Hao et al., 2011; Subramanian, 2012, 2011) described in the context of ensuring security of outsourced data under different systems. While all these schemes provided the solutions for efficient public auditing and provable assurance on the integrity, confidentiality and availability of remotely stored data, none of the schemes addressed the all three security requirements in multi-cloud environments.
Very recently, Zhu et al. (2012) proposed a cooperative provable data possession (CPDP) for integrity verification in multi-cloud storage environments. They achieved only integrity of data. However, they are not able to address other security requirements: confidentiality and availability of data. Another drawback is that their scheme requires an additional trusted organiser to send a commitment to the auditor during the auditing process. Similarly, Yang and Jia (2013) proposed an efficient and secure dynamic auditing protocol is desired to convince data owners that the data is correctly stored in the cloud in multi owners and multiple provider environments. Like Zhu et al. (2012) , this scheme also does not address all the three security requirements, which are always important aspects of quality of service (QoS) .
To achieve the data storage security in multi-cloud architectures such as confidentiality, integrity and availability, we propose an effective and secure cloud storage scheme. In our scheme, first, we encrypt the data to protect the confidentiality of data from unauthorised parties and encode the data to ensure the availability of data before storing in the cloud. Finally, we utilise homomorphic authenticator signatures and periodic verification based on random sampling to ensure the integrity of data stored in cloud. The periodic verification allows a public verifier, which allows anyone, not just the owner, to challenge the server for data integrity without having original file or without retrieving the data file from the server. Further, we extend our verification method to support batch verification for multiple owners to improve the verification performance. Our scheme achieves the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data stored in the multi-cloud and supports batch verification for integrity. Through the extensive security and performance analysis, we show that our scheme is efficient and more secure than existing schemes against internal threats and external threats. We also compare the results of our scheme with existing schemes in terms of security and performance parameters.
Specially, our contributions are:
1 We design an effective and secure data storage protocol in multi-cloud environments. Our scheme ensures the confidentiality of data by encrypting it and data availability by encoding the data using raptor code 2 Our scheme enables the TPA to check the data integrity in the cloud without having a knowledge of data. It greatly reduces the computational overhead of the data owner 3 Further, we extend our verification protocol to support batch verification for multiple owners. The multiowner batch verification can greatly improve the system performance, especially in multi cloud storage systems.
4 Finally, we discuss the security features of the proposed scheme. Besides, we justify its performance through theoretical analysis, experimental results and compare the results of our scheme with existing schemes in terms security and performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the related work. Section 3 introduces problem definition, which includes multi-cloud data storage architecture, threats, goals, preliminaries and definitions. Section 4 provides a detailed description about the proposed scheme. Section 5 extends our auditing protocol to support the batch verification for multiple owners. Sections 6 and 7 give the detailed implementation of our model with security, performance analysis and experimental results, and Section 8 give the conclusion to our work.
Related work
Many researchers have addressed the problem of proving security of outsourced data at untrusted storage servers. Ateniese et al. (2007) first described a 'Provable Data Possession (PDP)', it utilises RSA-based homomorphic authenticator tags for auditing outsourced data and suggested a random blocks of file. It efficiently detects file corruptions but this may reveal sensitive information to external parties. Similarly, Juels and Kaliski (2007) described a 'Proof of Retrievability (POR)' protocol for verification of remote file integrity and availability. Shacham and Waters (2008) extended a POR protocol to compact POR using homomorphic authenticators that are built from provable secure BLS signatures. Their scheme achieves the availability and integrity of data. However, all these schemes focus on static data. For example, these are suitable for static files like medical bills, library documents. In order to support dynamic data operations, Ateniese et al. (2008) developed a dynamic PDP solution called scalable PDP but the servers can deceive the owners by use of previous metadata and users cannot perform block insertions anywhere. Based on this work, Erway et al. (2009) also extended the PDP (Ateniese et al., 2008) model to support dynamic updates on the stored data and proposed two dynamic PDP scheme. However, their schemes may cause heavy computation burden to the server. Wang et al. (2011) proposed a dynamic auditing protocol that can support the dynamic operations of the data on the cloud servers. Similarly, Barsoum and Hasan (2013) proposed a dynamic audit service to verify the integrity of outsourced data at untrusted cloud servers.
However, not all the schemes protect the confidentiality of user's data from unauthorised parties, because data is stored in the cloud without encryption.
To protect the confidentiality of data, Wang et al. (2013) proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing scheme for data storage security in cloud computing but it is not protecting privacy of data from malicious insiders, because the file is stored in cloud without any encryption mechanism. Similarly, Hao et al. (2011) proposed a privacy-preserving remote data integrity checking protocol with data dynamics and public verifiability.
Although all these schemes achieved the integrity and privacy of remote data assurance under different systems, they do not provide a strong integrity assurance to the clients because they all are verifying remote data integrity using pseudorandom sequence. If we use pseudorandom sequence to verify the integrity of data in cloud, may get uncertainty of data integrity assurance. This uncertainty leads to data in inconsistent state.
To avoid uncertainty about data integrity assurance, Syam and Subramanian (2012) proposed a RSA-based dynamic auditing protocol to address the integrity of data. Their scheme ensures the integrity of data through challenge-response protocol using spot-checking based on sobol sequence. However, it lacks in assuring confidential data stored in cloud. In their subsequent work, Syam and Subramanian (2012) designed a public verifiable secret sharing protocol for the integrity and confidentiality of data.
Although all above schemes provided the solutions for the Integrity, Confidentiality and availability of remotely stored data under different systems, none of the scheme addressed all the three issues in multi-cloud storage environments.
Very recently, Zhu et al. (2012) proposed a CPDP for integrity verification in multi-cloud storage environments. They achieved only integrity of data in multi-cloud. However, they are not addressed the other security requirements: confidentiality and availability of data. Another drawback is that their scheme requires an additional trusted organiser to send a commitment to the auditor during the auditing, because their scheme applies the mask technique to ensure the data privacy. Similarly, Yang and Jia (2013) proposed an efficient and secure dynamic auditing protocol to convince data owners that data are correctly stored in multi owner and multiple provider environments. Like Zhu et al. (2012) , this scheme also does not address the all three security requirements of multi-cloud storage, which are important aspects of QoS.
Problem statement

Multi-cloud storage architecture
The multi-cloud storage architecture is depicted in Figure 1 . It consists of three different entities: data owners, CSPs and third party auditor (TPA) • Data owner: The owner, who stores data files in the cloud and access them through a service provider. They can be either individual clients or organisations.
• CSPs: The CSPs belong to multiple clouds who work together to provide data storage services and have enough storage and computational resources. They are expertise in building, managing distributed storage servers and providing storage as a service.
• TPA: A TPA, who has sufficient access to the providers environment and has expertise and capabilities that owner does not. We assume that TPA who is in the business of remote data auditing upon user request and with proper safeguards, he is reliable and independent. The typical interactions between these three entities of the system see in Figure 1 are follows:
1 the data owner stores the data in cloud and access the data from cloud with help of CSP as shown in Figure 2 2 the TPA verifies the integrity of data stored in cloud through challenge-response protocol as shown in Figure 3 , i.e., TPA sends challenge to CSPs and the CSPs send response to TPA. 
System model
In multi-cloud storage model, the data owners store their data into two or more clouds that is either public or private and accesses it with help of cloud service provider (CSP) whenever and wherever they need. As data owners no longer have control over their data at locally, it is critical importance to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in the cloud. Because, if such data stored in multi-cloud is vulnerable to internal and external attacks, which prevent the users from accessing the original data correctly. Therefore, effective and secure methods are needed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data over the lifetime with minimum computation, communication and storage overhead. The data owner encrypts and encodes the data before storing it in cloud to protect confidentiality and availability of data. Later, the data owners may choose TPA to verify the integrity of data; the TPA verifies the data integrity in multi-cloud through challenge-response protocol without having a copy of data file and not creating any additional online burden for owners and servers. The TPA would help owners to evaluate the risk of their data storage services and it is beneficial for the service providers to improve their cloud-based service platform.
Threats
Here, we are considering two types of threats to cloud storage:
1 The CSPs are untrusted, thus the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in the multi-cloud may be at risk. For economic incentives and maintaining a reputation, the CSPs may hide data loss, or reclaim storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely accessed. Hence, the CSP may return damaged data for any access request from the authorised users. Furthermore, the CSP may not honour the access rights created by the owner, and permit unauthorised access for the misuse of confidential data.
2 On the other hand, a data owner and authorised users may collude and falsely accuse the CSP to get a certain amount of reimbursement. They may dishonestly claim that data integrity over cloud servers has been violated
Goals
We propose effective and secure data storage protocol in multiple clouds to achieve the following goals:
1 Confidentiality: Outsourced data must be protected from the TPA, CSP, and users that are not granted access.
2 Integrity: Outsourced data are required to remain intact on cloud servers. The data owner and authorised users must be enabling to detect data corruption over the CSP side.
3 Data availability: To make sure that data stored in cloud should be available always against data loss incidents.
4 Low overhead: All above three goals should be achieved with minimum communication and computation overhead.
Notations and preliminaries
• F is a data file to be stored in cloud, it is composed of a sequence of n blocks, i.e., F = {m 1 , m 2 , …, m n } where each block m i ∈ Z q for some large prime q.
• E(R): An encryption function, with R as the encryption key.
Is a cryptographic hash function.
• f key (.): Sobol random function (SRF) defined as: {0, 1} * × key → Zq.
• π key (.): Sobol random permutation (SRP) defined as:
n n key × →
Technical backgrounds 3.6.1 Bilinear map
The bilinear map (Wang et al., 2013 ) is one of the essential building blocks of our scheme. Let G 1 , G 2 , and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. Let g 1 and g 2 be generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively. A bilinear map is a map e: G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following properties:
2 Non-degenerate: e(g 1 , g 2 ) ≠ 1.
3 Computability: There is a an efficient algorithm for computing e. u, v) xy for all u ∈ G 1 , v ∈ G 2 and x, y ∈ Zq.
Raptor codes
The raptor codes (Shokrollahi, 2006) used to create redundant k data blocks from m original data blocks. Thus, the original data can be recovered from any k out of m blocks. Raptor code is a two-stage process with (m, k) linear block code C (called pre-code) as the outer code and an LT code specified by a node degree distribution Ω(x) as the inner code. The probability distribution of m is characterised by a generating polynomial:
Here, m = i occurs with probability Ω i . The encoding algorithm of raptor code maps k information symbols into m intermediate symbols and then runs an LT encoder to generate a fountain of output symbols. Similarly, the decoding algorithm is the cascade of LT and pre-code decoding. We will call this decoder reliable for length n if the k data symbols can be recovered from any n encoding symbols with probability at most 1/k c , where c is a constant.
Definitions
In order to prove the security of data stored in a multi-cloud environment, we define an effective security framework for data storage, which consists of the following definitions: pr, pk) : Is a random key generation algorithm that is run by the data owner to setup the system. It takes a large security parameter k as input and produces a public/private key pair (pr, pk) • Encryption (F, R) →F′: Is run by owner to encrypt the data using elliptic curve cryptography, it takes file F, random key R, and produce file F′.
• Encode ( ) ( )
This algorithm runs by owner to encode the data file using raptor code. It takes i m′ as input and produce ij m′ as output.
• SigGen (sk, F′) → (σ ij ): Is a (possibly random) algorithm run by owner to generate verification metadata, which are signatures. It takes private key sk and file F′, which is an ordered collection of blocks { }, ij m′ as inputs and produce set of signatures (metadata) as output, i.e., φ, which is an ordered collection of signatures set {σ i }
• Chalenge(F info ), → (Q): This algorithm takes abstract information of the data F info as input and outputs a challenge Q.
• GenProof(pk, F'′, Q, Ø) → {μ ik , σ}: Is run by each cloud server in order to generate integrity proof of data stored in cloud. It takes public key pk, file F′, signatures Ø, and challenge query Q as inputs and produce output P, where P = (μ ik , σ).
• VerifyProof(pk, Q, P) → {0, 1}: This algorithm run by TPA to validate the proof of integrity from cloud servers. It takes public key pk, challenge query Q, and proof P and return output as 1 if the integrity of file is verified as correct or 0 otherwise.
Framework for effective and secure data storage
In order to secure the data storage in multi-cloud environments, we propose new security framework. It consists of two phases namely: 1 setup phase, where the data owner pre-process the file before storing it in the cloud 2 verification phase, where the TPA verifies the integrity of data based on challenge-response protocol.
The procedure of our design framework is depicted in Figure 4 :
Framework for effective and secure data storage
Setup phase
In setup phase, the data owner pre-processes the file before storing it in the multiple clouds. It consists of four algorithms, namely: key generation, encryption, encoding, and signature generation. The procedures of these algorithms are given as follows:
1 The data owner runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate the system's (pk, pr) public key and private key pairs respectively. He picks a random x → Zq, a random element u → G 1 , and generates y ← g x and w ← u x . The private key is pr = (x, u) and public key is pk = (y, w).
2 In order to protect the data confidentiality, the data owner runs the Encryption algorithm to encrypts the file by using Eliptic curve encryption function with random key R, i.e., F′ = E(R, F). The encrypted file F′ has the same length with F. Let F = {m 1 , m 2 , m n } each with |q| bit length. which states that the original file can be reconstructed from any i out of j blocks. Then, the encoded block ij m′ is subdivided into s sectors, i.e.:
where each sector ijk q m Z ′ ∈ for some large prime.
4 Now, data owner runs the SinGen algorithm to compute signatures σ ij on each block m ij in file F′: 5 Later, the data owner sends {F′, φ} to the CSP, and sends file information and public key (F inf , pk) to TPA for later verification and deletes metadata and file from its local storage.
Verification phase
After data stored in multi-cloud, the TPA verifies the integrity of data in cloud as follows:
1 the verifier generates a challenge with set of random index coefficient pairs Q k and send to all the CSPs(P k ) in the multi-cloud 2 each CSP(P k ) returns its response for challenge to the verifier 3 then, the verifier synthesises a final response from received responses and checks the integrity of data.
This phase consists of three algorithms: Challenge, GenProof and VerifyProof.
Challenge
The verifier runs challenge algorithm to generate challenge Q k for each provider P k where k ∈ {1, …, p} as follows:
1 The TPA selects a random c-element subset I = {s l , …, s c } of the set [l, n] using SRP (Mascagni et al., 2000) , where we assume that { } ( )
the randomly chosen permutation key by TPA. This key is used to prevent the CSP from cheating the verifier by using blocks at deferent indices.
2 The TPA also selects random key k SRF for each i ε I and generates
and creates a challenge Q k = {i, v i } i∈I which specifies the positions of the blocks that are required to be verified in this verification phase.
3 Then, the TPA sends Q k = {i, v i } i∈I to each provider P k in multi-cloud where 1≤ k ≤ p.
GenProof
Upon receiving a challenge Q k = {i, v i } i∈I , from TPA, each CSP in P k runs GenProof algorithm to generate a response as integrity proof as follows.
( )
Verify proof
After receiving the response from the each CSP, the TPA runs VerifyProof algorithm to validate the response as follows:
1 The verifier combines the all responses from P k into final response due to homomorpic property of signatures that is:
2 After combines all the responses into one, then, the TPA checks the data integrity by following equation:
. ,
If so, output returns 1 otherwise 0.
Batch verification
Data storage verification is a significant service in cloud computing that enable TPA to check the data integrity on the cloud servers. Sometimes, this type of verification is not efficient due to the large number of data owners; the TPA may receive many auditing requests from multiple data owners. In this situation, we should extend our single verification process to batch verification by combining all requests together and batch of files can be verified at a time.
Procedure for batch verification
The procedure of extending our single user verification scheme in multi cloud to multi-user verification scheme is described as follows: Assume there are n data owners in the system and each one has file F i = {m d,1 …. m d,n } to be outsourced to the cloud server, where d = {1, ….., n}.
The batch verification procedure also contains the all algorithms of single verification process in Section 4:
• Key generation: In key generation algorithm, each data owner runs keyGen algorithm to generate private-key pr = (x d , u d ) ∈ Z q and the public key pk = (y d , w d ).
• Encryption: In encryption algorithm, each data owner encrypts the data as
• Encoding: The encrypted file can be encoded as
then each block is subdivided into sectors as
( 1 3 )
• SigGen: In this algorithm, the data owner computes the signatures for given file Then, each CSP in P k generate a integrity proof:
The server then responds the verifier with response {μ d,ik , σ}.
• VerifyProof: After receiving response from each CSP in multi-cloud (P k ), the verifier combines them into as single response due to homomorpic property of signatures as follows.
, ,
the verifier can check if the following equation holds:
The above equation is similar to the integrity checking equation in the single-owner case.
Security analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of proposed scheme in terms of integrity, confidentiality and availability of data.
Integrity
The integrity means, the outsourced data is required to remain intact on multi-cloud servers. The integrity of data assurance has to satisfy the following properties: completeness, soundness and probability detection.
Completeness
The completeness property implies that if server honestly computes a correct integrity proof, the verifier always accepts the proof as valid with high probability.
Theorem 1:
The proposed protocol is complete in random oracle model.
Proof: For all available signatures and random challenge, the verification protocol should be complete with successful probability according to the equation (10), if this equation holds; the completeness property will be satisfied.
The above equation for integrity proof as elaborated as follows: We prove this equation by taking LHS: 
.1 Completeness property of batch verification
Now, we prove the completeness of batch verification process using following equation:
we prove this equation by taking LHS: 
,
Hence, it is proved. □
Soundness
The soundness property means if the server dishonestly computes the integrity proof by missing some data blocks, the verifier accepts it with negligible probability. We analyse the soundness of our scheme depending on hardness of Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem (Boneh et al., 2001 ).
• CDH Problem: Given g, g x , g y ∈ G for some group G and x, y ∈ Zq, to compute g xy .
Theorem 2:
The proposed protocol is sound in random oracle model.
Proof:
In this proof, we prove that our protocol is sound against the dishonest CSP depending on the hardness of the CDH problem.
During the integrity verification, the main threat from the dishonest CSP is that lost some part of the data and tries to convince the verifier that has it, i.e., the CSP try to fool the verifier by sending a false proof when some data blocks are lost. The malicious CSP may fool the verifier in two ways:
1 Forge attack: The server may forge the signatures of data block and deceive the verifier, if the owner secret keys are reused for the different versions of data.
2 Replay attack: The server may replay the previous response for challenge without computing integrity proof.
All these lead to contradiction because:
1 the server cannot forge the signatures based on hardness of solving CDH problem 2 In challenge, each time v i is chosen randomly by the verifier, so server cannot reply previous response for challenged blocks.
Therefore, it is infeasible for CSP to fool the verifier by sending false response. Hence, our protocol is sound in a random oracle model even if collusion is attempted. □
Probability detection
The data corruptions should be detected with high probability in a random sampling modal, if any data is modified or deleted.
Theorem 3: Our scheme guarantee that any modification to data stored in multi-cloud can be detected with very high probability.
Proof: in this proof, we have to prove that our scheme detects the data corruptions with high probability.
Suppose, the server stores an n-block file, out of which ρ blocks are corrupted. The TPA verifies these blocks by randomly selecting cs different blocks over the entire file to reduce computation overhead of the server and verifier. Let X is discrete random variable defined as number of blocks chosen by TPA that matches the blocks corrupted by adversary. We compute P x as the probability of that at least one of the blocks picked by TPA matches one of the blocks corrupted by server, i.e.,
where n is of the total number data blocks of a file; c is the number of challenged data blocks in a query; s is the number of sectors in each data block; ρ is the fraction of data blocks/sector corruption. The above equation should detect the data corruptions with high probability in multi-cloud storage system. □
Confidentiality
In this section, we analyse the confidentiality of data against data leakage depending on hardness of discrete logarithm problem • DL problem: Given g, y ∈ G for some group G, find x such that y = g x .
Theorem 4:
The proposed protocol is confidential: the data cannot be leaked to unauthorised parties.
Proof:
In this proof, we show that no information of i m′ can be learned from F′ this is because i m′ is encrypted by data owner before storing it in the cloud as F′ = E(R, F) where R is randomly chosen by data owner. Because of encrypting data file, the adversary cannot access the file. If attacker wants to access the file, need a random key R, which known to data owner only, so it is difficult for attaker to get key based on hardness of solving DL problem. Hence, our scheme is confidential against data leakage. □
Availability
The original data file is always available to users whenever they want to accesses it.
Theorem 5: Given a fraction of blocks of an encoded file F′, it is possible to recover the entire original file F′ with all but negligible probability.
Proof: Since data blocks are encoded before outsourcing it into multi-cloud, the original file can be recoverable and retrievable if an attacker corrupts a fraction of data blocks. Therefore, our scheme gives guaranty to file retrievablility safely even if some data blocks lost. □ The security proof of the batch verification is similar to the single-owner case, thus it omitted here.
Performance analysis and experimental results
Performance analysis
In this section, we present the performance analysis of our scheme and compare results with existing scheme. The analysis consists of two parameters: communication cost and computation cost. 
Computation cost
Here, we analyse the computation cost of data owner, server and TPA as follows:
• Data owner: We measure the computation cost of data owner for encoding and decoding of the data. The encoding process is simply the cascade of pre-code and LT encoders. Hence, the Raptor code maps k data blocks into m intermediate blocks and then run an LT encoder to generate a fountain of output blocks. The resulting encoding cost is the sum of the encoding costs of the individual codes, i.e., O(1). Similarly, the decoding process is the cascade of LT and pre-code decoding. We call this decoder reliable for length n if the k data blocks can be recovered from any n encoding blocks with probability at most 1/k c , where c is a constant. The decoding cost is again the sum of the individual decoding costs, i.e., O(1).
• Server or CSP: We measure the time of the server for generating response for challenged data blocks. Upon receiving a challenge query from TPA, then each server generates response, which includes an aggregated signatures
and linear combination of sampled blocks ( , ) .
the total computation cost of server for computing proof (σ, μ ik ) is: 
Communication cost
Here, we analyse the communication cost between the verifier and the server during verification phase and not analysing the communication cost between owner, verifier, and between owner and server, because their communication done only once during the initialisation. So, in verification process, the TPA sends challenge Q k = (i, v i ) to all the CSPs and each CSP sends response {σ, μ ik }as a proof back to TPA.
As there are totally n file blocks, the length of Q k is upper bounded by c|q| + |n| bits. The length of μ ik is (ns + c) |q| bits and length of σ is 2|q| bits. The total communication cost is:
Experimental results
In our implementation settings, on server side, we use a 'large' Amazon EC2 instance. This instance type provides total memory of size 7.5 GB and 4 EC2 Compute Units (two virtual cores with two EC2 Compute Units each). One EC2 Compute Unit provides the equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0-1.2 GHz 2007 Xeon processor. The TPA side, we use a separate server, which has Intel(R) Xeon(TM) 3.6 GHz processor, 2.75 GB RAM, and Windows XP operating system. The data owner side, we use a desktop computer with Intel(R) 2 GHz processor and 4 GB RAM running with Windows XP. Without loss of generality, the algorithms (hashing, encryption.) are implemented using the pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library version 0.4.18 for the underlying elliptic-curve group (Hu et al., 2007) . For a 128-bit security level, we utilise an elliptic curve defined over Galois Field GF(p) with |p| = 256 bits, and a cryptographic hash of size 256 bits (e.g., SHA-256).
Computation cost
In computation cost, we can see the results of Data Owner, Server and Verifier:
• Data owner: We evaluate the encoding and decoding time of file blocks in Figures 5 and 6. From Figures 5 and 6 , we can observe that, the raptor code takes very less time for encoding and decoding the data than tornado codes, LT codes, and Reed-Solomon Code. Hence, our scheme is efficient than other existing schemes when encoding and decoding the large data files.
• Server or CSP: Figure 7 shows the computation cost of server for generating response of different challenged blocks. From Figure 7 , we can see that our scheme incurs less computation cost of the server than CPDP (Zhu et al., 2012) scheme when cope with large number of challenged data blocks.
• Verifier or TPA: Figure 8 describes the computation cost of the TPA for verifying integrity of data. The proposed scheme has the lowest verification time when compares to the CPDP (Zhu et al., 2012) while achieving 99% probability detection. We do the comparison under the same probability of detection. That is if integrity of data is verified by using sobol random sequence instead of pseudorandom sequence, the data corruptions could be detected efficiently.
• Computation cost of batch verification: We also conduct experiments for multi owner batch auditing and demonstrate its results in Figure 9 , where the number of data owners in the system is increased from 100 to approximately 500 with intervals of 5. From Figure 9 , it is easy to find that our scheme incurs less computation cost of the verifier than existing scheme (Yang and Jia, 2013) , especially when there are a large number of clouds in the large-scale multi-cloud storage systems. Table 2 Comparison of existing schemes with our scheme 
Hao et al, ) Note: n is of the total number data blocks of a file; c is the number of challenged data blocks in a query; s is the number of sectors in each data block. Figure 10 present the communication cost of our scheme and existing scheme. In Figure 10 , we can see that the communication cost of our scheme grows linearly with the number of data blocks while achieving 99% probability detection. That is because their communication process involves two round process, i.e., organiser to verifier, verifier to organiser and organiser to verifier. In our scheme, the server directly sends the integrity proof to the verifier and does not require any additional trusted organiser. Thus, our scheme incurs less communication cost than CPDP (Zhu et al., 2012) .
Communication cost
Comparison with existing schemes
Here, we compare our scheme with some existing remote checking schemes in terms of the efficiency, integrity, availability, confidentiality, support of dynamic operations and the batch verification for multiple owners. From Table 2 , we can find that many of existing schemes are not providing confidentiality and availability of data along with integrity in multi-cloud storage architectures. Therefore, our scheme is better than other systems in multi-cloud storage architectures.
Conclusions
Although security services in the cloud can be fine-tuned and managed by experts that can potentially provide efficient security management and threat assessment services. In this paper, we discussed about storage security issues and proposed effective and secure data storage scheme in multi-cloud. The proposed scheme achieved the guaranty of data retrievability against data loss by encoding the file using raptor code. The confidentiality of data is protected from against unauthorised parties and malicious insiders by encrypting the file. The guaranty of data integrity is achieved by using homomorphic authentication signatures and spot-checking based on random sampling. It allows a TPA to determine whether the data is intact in multi-cloud and returns it to the owner, ensuring that received the original data. Our scheme removes the burden of verification from owners, and alleviates owners fear about data leakage and data loss or damage. Through the security, performance analysis and experimental results, we have proved that our scheme is effective and more secure against security threats
